‘lays down basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible (…). Whereas the morality of aspiration deals with the higher aims in life, being excellence and the ‘top of human achievement,’ the morality of duty: In the beginning of The Morality of Law Fuller famously distinguishes between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration. ![]() Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. Subsequently, in sections 4 and 5, I deal with two points of convergence between Arendt’s and Fuller’s legal thoughts, while also opening the discussion on some of Rundle’s proposals and arguments along the way. For that reason, and before responding directly to some of Rundle’s arguments, I will first explain my own reading of Fuller’s and Arendt’s thoughts on the experience of legal injustice in sections 2 and 3. This shift in focus needs some preparation. These points all revolve around the idea that the experience of legal failure or legal injustice – rather than the experience of law as such, as Rundle seems to suggest – is a pivotal junction for both thinkers. Instead, my aim is to focus on a few points in the theories of Fuller and Arendt and to derive my main remarks or points of criticism from them. My response does not deal with all the aspects addressed by Rundle in her paper. ![]() Kristen Rundle has written a very interesting and extensive paper in which she tries to read together Arendt’s and Fuller’s thoughts on the fascinating relationship between the juridical person as a responsible agent and law’s institutional framework.
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